ASOR interoperability artifacts - snapshot 2026-10-07 This directory is immutable. Corrections and later revisions are published under a new dated directory; nothing here is edited in place. SHA256SUMS covers every file here except index.html and itself. Single archive Everything here is also published as one file, asor-2026-10-07.zip, so it can be taken in one piece. Its contents mirror this directory with index.html left out. The copy of SHA256SUMS inside the archive covers those contents; the SHA256SUMS on the download page also covers the archive itself. Contents vectors/reject_refresh_reparent.json Adversarial vector offered to the -02 vector set of draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain (author: Rafael Asor). A validly-issued child token is presented with a RE-ISSUED copy of the parent it was delegated under: identical authority (iss, sub, scopes, ceilings, ttl, iat, exp, depth fields), honestly re-signed over its new bytes, differing only in jti. The child's par_hash still commits to the original parent's signing input, so verification step 2 - the par_hash byte commitment - rejects it with par_hash_mismatch. Steps 1, 3, 4 and 5 pass, so subsumption cannot catch this. vectors/control_valid_under_actual_parent.json The same child under its actual parent: accept. A local control for attribution. It is byte-identical to the first two tokens of the existing valid_chain vector, so it is not offered to the corpus. vectors/reject_refresh_reparent_timeshift.json The same class with iat and exp shifted by the same delta (ttl unchanged). Not offered to the corpus. java/ Java implementation of the offline verification algorithm; a port of attenu-io/attenu-guard at e2fd094 (v0.19.1). Sources only - no compiled binary is published. See java/README.txt. patch/ The offered vector as a patch against the reference implementation's own harness: one new vector in both committed copies, plus the generator, the expected-file set, VECTOR_NAMES and the vectors README. Nothing else. Vector category Complementary to the existing reject_spliced_parent vector, which substitutes a DIFFERENT, broader, attacker-chosen parent. Here the parent's authority does not move; only the token instance does. The vector pins the outcome and the mechanism, not a choice between the two refresh models discussed on the WIMSE list. What is not claimed No vulnerability, no attack, no production-security statement. The Java implementation is a second implementation in a different language by the same party that produced these vectors - not independent third-party validation. The corpus covers verification steps 1-5; holder binding, status lists and actual-action authorization are out of scope. Verify sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS